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ABSTRACT
System-generated or user-generated text-based passwords are commonly used by the
users to authenticate access to their electronic assets. These passwords may vary in usability
and memorability depending on the type of password generation, composition and length.
However, little past research has compared usability and memorability of passwords,
satisfying minimum entropy for a secure password. This study compared three password
policy conditions, assigning/generating passwords of approximately equal minimum security,
i.e. 6-character alphanumeric system-generated passwords, minimum 8-character restricted
user-generated passwords and minimum 16-character unrestricted user-generated passwords.
The study involved 54 participants, equally divided into three groups, 18 in each password
policy condition. The study took place over two sessions, with a period of 5-7 days in
between them. In the first session, depending on the password policy condition, the
participants were either assigned or asked to create a password. The participants were then
asked to recall their passwords in the same session and after 5-7 days in the second session.
The three password policy conditions were compared with respect to the dependent
variables-- the time taken to create the password account, the password creation error rates,
the time taken to recall and recall error rates for both sessions, the number of unrecoverable
passwords in the second session, the proximity of the recalled password to the stored
password measured by Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler edit distances, and the
subjective ratings for the NASA task load indices and the System Usability Scale
questionnaire.
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There was significant difference between the password policy condition for the time taken
to create a password account, password creation error rates, time taken to recall the
passwords and temporal demand index of the NASA-TLX questionnaire. Across the task
sessions, there were statistically significant differences for time taken to recall systemgenerated passwords, recall error rates, performance index of the NASA-TLX questionnaire
and the SUS score. There was no significant difference for recall error rates and
unrecoverable passwords among password policy conditions.
The results of this study suggest that the overall performance of the 8-character password
was weaker compared to system-generated and 16-character passwords. The qualitative
analysis of the comments made by the participants and the additional analysis of the usergenerated passwords suggests that the participants showed bias towards the commonly used
8-character password policy condition. However, this bias did not translate into better
memorability of the 8-character password. The performance and the positive trends exhibited
by 16-character passwords indicate a potential area for the password application designers to
explore.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Computer authentication systems in the 1970s and early 1980s were primarily used by
defense facilities, organizations and universities to control access to their sensitive assets.
These authentication systems employed a two-part procedure, user identification and user
authentication. The users identified themselves by logging in using the alphanumeric id
they had created. While in the authentication procedure, they “shared a secret” in the
form of a password with a computer to establish their credentials (Brostoff & Sasse,
2000). This password was either assigned or created, and subsequently memorized by the
users. This concept of user ids and passwords was found to be a cost-effective and
efficient method of maintaining security (Conklin, Dietrich, & Walz, 2004). One of the
key elements in these systems was the reliance on human cognitive ability to remember
both, the most important being the password (Conklin et al., 2004). Since the users were
expected to remember their passwords when prompted without writing them down, these
authentication systems were also called knowledge-based.
The earliest passwords were generated by the system and assigned to the user
employees to ensure overall security (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997) (Adams & Sasse,
1999). However, as they were composed of apparently random characters having no
meaning for the users, they were more difficult to remember than user-generated ones
(Zviran & Haga, 1993). This high degree of complexity caused users to externalize them
by writing them down, leading to potential breaches in security (Zviran & Haga, 1993). It
led to user-generated passwords becoming widely used (Adams et al., 1997) even though
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system-generated ones are more difficult to guess (Zviran & Haga, 1993). To enhance the
security of user-generated passwords, they can be selected from a large domain of
character sets, giving them the appearance of being randomly generated (Zviran & Haga,
1993). However, password guidelines that encourage users to do this, though they may
help to create passwords that are difficult to crack, become difficult to use (Conklin et al.,
2004). The limitations associated with restrictions on user-generated passwords include
the time needed to generate an acceptable one, the guidelines that result in less
memorable ones than those generated without them, and the additional restrictions that
may cause more entry errors and lengthen the login procedure (Proctor, Mei-ching Lien,
Vu, Schultz, & Salvendy, 2002). This issue concerning password generation is made
more complex because users also tend to form their own mental models of good
passwords regardless of the instructions provided, favoring memorability over security
(Forget, Chiasson, & Biddle, 2007). As a result, users circumvent password guidelines
when given a chance, meaning that their passwords are still subject to being breached by
brute force attacks. In such attacks, the intruder creates and matches with the target
password all possible combinations using a standard US keyboard of 94 characters
(Allendoerfer, K., & Pai, S., 2005). In order to protect against such attacks, password
guidelines recommend the use of all character sets and longer passwords (Allendoerfer et
al., 2005).
With the advent of PCs in offices, school and homes, the user base has grown both in
number and in its demographics (Conklin et al., 2004). In addition, the increased use of
the internet has led to an increase in the number of password applications (Conklin et al.,
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2004). Users now have multiple web accounts ranging from banking to retail, each with a
different password (Conklin et al., 2004), creating a significant usability problem
(Brostoff et al., 2000). To address these memorability issues, alternate authentication
systems, such as biometric systems and image-based passwords systems, were introduced
in the 1990s. Biometrics utilizes physical attributes such as finger prints, the retina, or
characteristic behavior such as the signature and voice of the user for authentication
(Clarke & Furnell, 2005). However, these authentication systems are expensive,
obtrusive, difficult to implement on a large scale and have low user acceptance (Proctor
et al., 2002). Similarly, image-based passwords, relying on the heuristic of recognition
being more memorable than recall, are not as prevalent due to such reasons as user
resistance to change from text-based passwords and the cost of modifying existing
systems (Jeyaraman & Topkara, 2005). Text-based passwords remain the most common
form of authentication (Forget et al., 2007), with user-generated passwords being
preferred because of their meaningfulness to the user and greater memorability. Recall of
material usually is better if users generate it rather than merely having it provided for
them (Proctor et al., 2002).
To improve security and usability of user-generated passwords, proactive usergenerated password checking, developed to ensure that user-generated passwords satisfy
the composition guidelines, is frequently implemented (Proctor et al., 2002). These
composition guidelines generally constrain user-generated passwords with respect to
length, composition of character sets and inclusion in a dictionary (Herley, 2009). In
early research, Zviran et al. (1993) compared the memorability of system-generated and
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user-generated passwords. More recently, researchers have compared the usability of
different user-generated password composition schemes. However, the passwords created
using different composition schemes in these studies achieved different levels of
minimum security, making comparisons across them difficult. To expand on this
research, this study compared passwords satisfying NIST Level 2 security requirements
that were either assigned by the system or created by the user using two different
composition schemes.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Random system-generated passwords were one of the first types to be implemented in
organizations to protect electronic information. Organizations assigned system-generated
passwords to the employees who either memorized or kept a record of them and loggedin to access systems which were password protected. By assigning passwords to
employees, organizations ensured that the combinations of characters were secure.
However, the responsibility for the security of electronic information has shifted from
the organizations to the users. The users create their own passwords for applications on
their personal computers, password systems or operating systems. These user-generated
passwords are easier to remember than the random system-generated passwords that
users were assigned. Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the new
millennium, the increased usage of internet-based technologies saw a higher
incorporation of user-generated password authentication systems for web sites, online
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applications and offline services, meaning the number of passwords per user has
increased.
To compare the usability and preferences of user-generated passwords and randomly
assigned passwords, Zviran et al. (1993) had 103 participants create two user-generated
passwords in addition to being assigned an eight-character random one as part of their
study. One of the user-generated passwords was a maximum of 8 characters long and the
other was an alphanumeric of up to 80 characters (passphrase). After three months, the
participants’ recall success rate was the highest for the 8-character user-generated
passwords, followed by assigned random passwords and then the 80-character passwords.
These results were supported by the data obtained with a subjective questionnaire in
which the participants ranked the 8-character user-generated passwords highest for appeal
and ease-of-recall. These passwords were further analyzed to determine the
characteristics affecting their recall. The results revealed that 92% were composed of
only lower case letters, suggesting better memorability of passwords of this composition.
Extending the focus of this study, Adams et al. (1997) investigated the memorability
and cognitive demands of user-generated passwords. Their analysis of the responses of
139 participants revealed that fifty percent of them externalized their passwords and/or
created similar passwords to cope with the cognitive demands associated with recalling
multiple ones. These results were confirmed by the in-depth interviews of 30 of these 139
participants. In addition, these interviews revealed that the use of common words and
personal data compromised the security of the passwords. As an extension of this study,
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Adams et al. (1999) proposed user-centered design of password systems and educating
users on password guidelines to cope with the cognitive demands associated with
multiple passwords. One of the objectives of this study was to investigate the
effectiveness of the early generic composition guidelines recommended by the Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS, 1985). Its criteria for the creation of usergenerated passwords of varying levels of security include length and the character sets
used, with the recommendation of a length of at least 4 characters and a composition
including numbers. However, cognitive demand and insufficient feedback on the strength
of the multiple passwords caused users to focus on memorability rather than security.
One of the recommendations of Adams et al. (1999) was to provide adequate online
feedback on the strength of the password entered as well as password composition
guidelines during creation to mitigate the need for having to change passwords at regular
intervals.
In a quantitative study of the memorability and composition of user-generated
passwords, Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, (2001) conducted a study in which 144 British
Telecom employees were asked to describe the reason for the need to reset their
passwords and to report the number of passwords they used at work. It was found that the
employees had an average of 16 passwords. The passwords which were infrequently used
were forgotten the most easily, followed by the moderately and then frequently used
passwords. However, the 6-digit passwords for accessing voicemails yielded different
results; irrespective of the frequency of use, their recall rate was low. Unlike passwords,
they were forgotten even after short durations of non-use. These results indicated the
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correlation between the composition of passwords and their memorability and recall,
further supporting the conclusion that the compositions of passwords affect their
memorability and recall irrespective of the frequency of their use.
To understand the effect of various composition schemes and additional
guidelines/restrictions on password usability, Proctor et al. (2002) conducted an
experiment involving 24 participants. For the first condition, called “minimal,” the
participants created a password of at least 5 characters. The second, called “additional,”
incorporated the additional guidelines of having at least one member from all the
character sets on a keyboard, at most one character from the username and no
consecutive similar characters. The participants were asked to rate each of the two
passwords on difficulty of generation and recall using a 7-point Likert scale, with 7 being
the most difficult. In the results, statistically significant difference was found between the
time taken to generate and recall minimal condition passwords and additional condition
passwords. Passwords with the additional composition restrictions were significantly
harder to generate and remember than those based on the minimal requirements. All of
the passwords created were subsequently subjected to a password cracking software. The
results further revealed that 18 of 24 minimal condition passwords were cracked
compared to eight of 24 in the additional condition, indicating the level of lower strength
of passwords in the former.
Using a similar procedure, Proctor et al. (2002) conducted a second experiment which
required a minimum length of at least 8 characters for the passwords. Similarly, the
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results of the second experiment found a statistically significant difference between the
time taken to generate and recall minimal condition passwords and those requiring
additional guidelines. Also similar to the first experiment, the qualitative data found that
passwords with additional guidelines were significantly harder to generate and remember
compared to passwords with only a length restriction. In addition, passwords in this
experiment were also subjected to cracking software, the results finding that four of
twenty-four minimal conditions passwords and three of twenty-four additional condition
passwords could be cracked. The results concerning the breached passwords from both
experiments suggested that the increase in the minimum length of minimal condition
passwords from 5 to 8 characters that led to an increase in their recall time were as
resistant to password cracking software as the minimum 8-character password
incorporating additional guidelines.
To understand the effect of user-generated passwords versus randomly selected
passwords on memorability, Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant (2004) compared the
ease of memorizing two user-generated passwords constructed based on different
composition guidelines and one randomly selected password. A total of 288 participants
were divided into three groups. The participants in the first group created a password of a
minimum of seven characters including at least one number. The participants in the
second created a password by randomly selecting eight characters from a list of printed
letters and numbers with their eyes closed. In the last group, the participants create a
mnemonic-based password by choosing any character from each word of a phrase and
representing it as a lower or upper case letter, a number or a special character. The
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participants were asked to create and keep a written record of their passwords until they
memorized them. After four months, the participants received a two-question email
asking them to subjectively rate the ease of memorizing the passwords from 1 to 5, with 5
being impossible, and to specify the duration participants referred to a written record until
they memorized their passwords. The first group considered memorizing their passwords
the easiest, rating it a 1.52, which was the lowest among the three groups. They also
indicated that it took 0.7 weeks to memorize the passwords compared to 0.6 weeks for
the mnemonics-based passwords and 4.8 weeks for the random passwords. These results
suggest that random passwords are far less memorable than user-generated ones.
However, the passwords of the three groups were of varying levels of strength due to
their length and composition, thus affecting the generalizability of the results. In addition,
keeping a written record of the passwords by the participants could also be considered a
limitation of a study associated with a knowledge-based authentication system.
To investigate the effect of password construction guidelines on user behavior, Kuo et
al. (2006) surveyed 290 participants. In the survey, a scheme of seven guidelines was
given to all the participants, including recommendations to include numbers, lower and
upper case letters, and special characters. The guidelines also recommended that
passwords be long enough, not include dictionary words, not be related to the web site
they were created for, and not be in a non-English language. The responses from the
participants indicated that the number of guidelines they considered depended on whether
they had received training on them earlier. There was a statistically significant difference
between the number of guidelines considered by the participants who were aware of
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password composition guidelines and the participants who were not. These results
suggest that educating users on password composition guidelines affects user behavior,
helping them to compose passwords that are both memorable and secure.
The increase in the variety and number of internet-based technologies and their
password authentication systems has led to multiple password composition schemes. To
study the issues of inconsistent password composition guidelines on an organizational
level, Allendoerfer et al. (2006) interviewed 52 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
employees, documenting their user experience with FAA password guidelines and
systems. The employees experienced increased cognitive demands due to inconsistency
in these guidelines, especially if they were similar but not exactly the same. Based on
these results, Allendoerfer et al. (2006) recommended consistent password guidelines for
all organizational password systems.
To address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
recommended the following user-generated password composition guidelines for all
electronic authentication purposes (Burr, National Institute of Standards, & Technology,
2006):
1) A minimum of 8 characters selected from the keyboard of 94 printable characters
2) At least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one number and one special
character
3) No common words or permutations of usernames
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User-generated passwords created using these guidelines have an estimated guessing
entropy of 30 bits, satisfying the Level 2 security recommended by NIST for password
authentication. For system-generated random passwords composed from the 94
characters on the keyboard, NIST estimates that five characters will satisfy its Level 2
security recommendation (Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 2006). However, since these guidelines
are only a recommendation, they are not widely implemented.
A more recent study investigating various user-generated password construction
schemes was conducted by Vu et al. (2007). They investigated the number of attempts
and the time required to generate passwords. They also evaluated the number of login
errors and the time required to recall these passwords after a short and long duration of
time. In the first of three experiments involving a total of 32 participants, 16 participants
created passwords for three accounts and the remaining 16 created them for five. These
user-generated passwords were restricted to at least six characters including an upper and
a lower case letter, a digit and a special character. These passwords were also required to
be unique for each of the three or five accounts and could not contain the participant’s
username or any variations of it. The participants were asked to recall and login to their
accounts four times in a random order 5 minutes after creation and after a week during a
second recall session. The group with five accounts made significantly more recall errors
than the group with three accounts. Most importantly, the experiment indicated that
creating unique passwords for increasingly more accounts increased memory load. This
conclusion was supported by the finding that 69 percent of the participants having five

11

accounts were unable recall their passwords after a week compared to 19 percent of the
participants with only three accounts.
In the second experiment, also including two recall sessions, 20 participants created
unique passwords for three accounts using the first letters of at least six words of a
meaningful sentence constructed by them. The password for the remaining 20
participants also used the first letters of at least six words of a meaningful selfconstructed sentence, but incorporated a digit and a special character. The results
indicated that the difference in the password generation time between the two groups was
statistically significant, with the first group taking 50.9 seconds and the latter 84.9
seconds. The results also indicated that the login errors and login times for the second
group were twice that for the first for both short-term and long-term recall. Sixty-two
percent of the user-generated passwords containing only letters were breached by
cracking software compared to 2 percent of the passwords including a digit and special
character. These results indicated that including a number and a special character
increased password security.
The first part of the third experiment compared generation times, login times, and
login errors for passwords created based on four conditions. Of 60 participants, 30
created passwords from the first letters of the words of a meaningful sentence they
constructed including a digit and a special character, similar to the second condition of
the previous experiment. The remaining participants created mnemonic-based passwords
by replacing entire words of the sentences constructed with similar sounding words and
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special characters as well as visually similar numbers and special characters. Fifteen of
the first group of 30 participants created passwords in the first session and were then
asked to enter them a week later in a second session. The remaining participants of the
first group created a password, entered it after a short break of 5 minutes and were then
asked to enter it again a week later in a second session. The second group of 30
participants who created mnemonic-based passwords were similarly split into two subgroups, 15 involved in long-term recall and the remaining 15 subjected to both short-term
and long-term recall. The results found that login times for passwords for long-term recall
following short-term recall were 25 seconds faster than login times for only long-term
recall for both first letter and mnemonic condition passwords. These results suggest that
short-term recall improved the ability of the participants to remember their passwords.
In the second part of the third experiment, 15 new participants created passwords
composed of the first letters of at least six words of a sentence constructed by them which
also included a digit and a special character. These passwords were immediately entered
with no short-term delay and then were recalled after a week. The results revealed that
these participants took 45 seconds to login immediately and 47 after a week, significantly
longer than mean login time of 21 seconds for the passwords created using the same
guidelines in the first part that were recalled after a short-term and long-term period.
These results suggested that the five-minute delay between password creation and shortterm recall helped participants to remember these passwords better.
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Although consistency of password composition schemes across systems can be
achieved in organizations, it is difficult to implement such consistency across web sites.
Florencio & Herley (2010) analyzed the password composition guidelines for 75 web
sites with medium to heavy internet traffic, including bank, government, university,
brokerage and defense web sites, to name a few. The password composition guidelines of
these web sites ranged from 1-character unrestricted passwords to 12-character passwords
including all character sets. The researchers found no correlation between the strength of
the passwords resulting from the password policies and the value of the assets, the
number of users, the size of the web site and the number of attacks on the web site. Some
of the commercial and social networking web sites that earned revenue with each login
imposed fewer restrictions on password composition, accommodating passwords that
were easy to create, recall and use for multiple login attempts. Complex password
composition guidelines, if implemented on such web sites, might cause revenue losses
due to a decrease in user traffic. This discussion suggests that password composition
guidelines should create usable passwords compatible with the nature of a web site and
its users.
Komanduri, Shay, Kelley, Mazurek, Bauer and Christin (2011) compared passwords
created by 5,000 participants, each assigned to one of five conditions across two sessions.
In the first condition, participants were asked to create at least eight-character passwords
for the purpose of completing a survey, referred to collectively as the Basic8Survey, with
no restrictions. In the second condition, participants created passwords for the purpose of
creating an e-mail account, called the Basic8, based on the same guidelines. The third
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condition, the Basic16, asked participants to create passwords of at least 16 characters
with no restriction on the character sets used. The fourth, named Dictionary8, created
passwords of at least 8 characters with no restrictions and with a dictionary check to
prevent the use of commonly used strings. The fifth condition, the Comprehensive8,
asked participants to create 8 character minimum passwords of at least a number, a
special character and both cases of letters, with a dictionary check.
The participants were asked to enter their respective passwords twice, the second time
to confirm the first entry. On successfully logging-in, the participants were asked to
complete a survey asking for their demographics, their rating of the password creation
process, and the strategies employed. The participants were again asked to re-enter their
passwords with a maximum of five attempts permitted. After two days, in the second
session the participants were asked to enter these passwords via an email with a
maximum of five attempts permitted to recall their passwords. The participants also
answered survey questions on password creation, storage and usage. The results from the
first session found that among the participants with at least one password creation failure,
Dictionary8 passwords were easier to create with fewer attempts required than the
Comprehensive8 passwords, but took significantly more attempts to create than the
Basic8, Basic8Survey and Basic16 passwords. Considering the cumulative password
creation failed attempts, Comprehensive8 passwords resulted in the highest number of
attempts with a mean of 3.35 followed by Dictionary8 passwords, the mean of which was
significantly higher than for the Basic16 passwords. Basic8 passwords exhibited
significantly fewer numbers of attempts at 1.13 compared to the other four conditions,
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with the Basic8Survey mean being marginally higher at 1.17. Approximately 25 percent
of the participants completely failed to create acceptable passwords in the
Comprehensive8. However, the completion failure rates for the participants in the other
conditions were significantly lower, all under 19 percent. The participants rated
Comprehensive8 passwords as significantly more difficult to recollect followed by the
Basic16 passwords.
In addition, the participants who did not externalize their passwords required an
average of 1.22 attempts to recall their passwords, with the difference in number of recall
attempts for each condition being significantly different from one another. Most of the
participants in the Comprehensive8 condition agreed that the creation of these passwords
was “annoying.” However, 67 participants in this condition believed that these passwords
would make their main email accounts more secure, suggesting that the perceived
strength of passwords may affect participant willingness to use those that are “annoying”
to create. Other findings suggest that Basic16 passwords were as secure as
Comprehensive8 passwords, but were relatively more usable. However, the study did not
consider the factor of password creation times in either session.
Alternate authentication technologies like biometric and image-based password
systems have been introduced to improve the memorability and reduce the cognitive
demands of user-generated passwords. Image-based password systems depend on user
recognition rather than recall. As a result, they are expected to be more memorable and
less mentally demanding than traditional text-based passwords. Dhamija & Perrig, (2000)
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compared image-based passwords to user-generated passwords with respect to task
completion time and error rates. Twenty participants created passwords and immediately
logged in and then re-logged in after a week. The user-generated passwords took less
time to create and login than the image-based passwords. After a week, the login times
for user-generated passwords were shorter than the login times for image-based
passwords, even though the login error rate for user-generated passwords increased. One
participant failed to login during the initial session using his/her user-generated password.
There were no failed logins in the initial session for the image-based password. In the
second session, user-generated passwords resulted in four more failed or unrecoverable
logins than image-based passwords. Dhamija et al. (2000) did not analyze the data on
task completion time and error rates for statistical significance. The results indicated that
user-generated passwords had shorter task completion times but were not as memorable
as the image-based passwords.
In a concurrent study, Brostoff et al. (2000) compared user-generated passwords to an
image-based password system called Passfaces, recruiting 34 under-graduate students
each of whom created both types of passwords. Logins, login failure rates, time before
first use and the number of login attempts were recorded after the participants were asked
to login again 3 months after creation. The results revealed that user-generated passwords
had a higher login failure rate of 15.1% compared to 4.9% for Passfaces, a statistically
significant difference. The time before first use of the user-generated passwords and
Passfaces was also significantly different, the time taken for the former being less than
for the latter. The number of login attempts for the user-generated passwords was found
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to be three times higher than the number of login attempts for Passfaces, also statistically
significant. These analyses show that participants using user-generated passwords took
less time to learn the system but had higher login errors, similar to the previous study.
The studies conducted by Dhamija et al. (2000) and Brostoff et al. (2000) found that the
usability of image-based passwords was marginally better than that of user-generated
passwords. User-generated passwords allow users to complete logins in a shorter amount
of time and reduce learning time, but these advantages are offset by a higher number of
login errors.
Previous research has compared the memorability and usability of system-generated
passwords and user-generated passwords. Passwords created under various composition
schemes have been compared in terms of login errors, task completion times, and recall
rates after a short- or long-term period or both. However, there is limited research
comparing user-generated passwords created under various conditions having
approximately minimum equal entropy other than that of Komanduri et al. (2011). This
study extended the research by Komanduri et al. (2011) by comparing the usability of
assigned system-generated passwords with user-generated passwords created under two
composition schemes, with all passwords satisfying the NIST Level 2 requirements of 30
bits of entropy.

3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

This study compared the usability of three types of text-based passwords of
approximately equal minimum security:
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1) An assigned 6-character system-generated password selected randomly from any
of the 36 alphanumeric characters available on the standard QWERTY keyboard.
2) A user-generated password of at least eight characters, with at least one lower
case letter, one upper case letter, a number and one special character. This
password must also pass a dictionary check.
3) A user-generated password of at least 16 characters with no restrictions; this
password must also pass a dictionary check.

To compare the usability of the passwords created under these three conditions, the
following hypotheses were proposed:

Hypothesis 1: The time taken to create a password account for the system-generated
password will be less than that required for the 8-character user-generated or 16-character
unrestricted user-generated password.

This result is expected due to the shorter length of the system-generated password.

Hypothesis 2a: The number of attempts required to create a valid password in the first
session will be lower for the 16-character unrestricted user-generated password than for
the 8-character restricted user-generated password.

These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character passwords
than 8-character passwords.
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Hypothesis 2b: The number of unrecoverable passwords and Damerau-Levenshtein edit
distance in the second session will be lower for the 16-character unrestricted passwords
than for the other passwords.

These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted
passwords than the 8-character restricted passwords and the 6-character alphanumeric
system-generated passwords.

Hypothesis 2c: The Jaro-Winkler proximities in the second session will be higher for the
16-character unrestricted password than for the other passwords.

These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted
passwords than the 8-character restricted passwords and the 6-character alphanumeric
system-generated passwords.

Hypothesis 2d: The NASA-TLX indices, time taken to recall and recall error rates will
be lower for the 16-character unrestricted password than for either of the other passwords
in both sessions.

These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted
passwords than the other passwords.

Hypothesis 2e: The ease-of-use will be higher for the 16-character unrestricted password
than for either of the other passwords in both sessions.
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These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted
passwords than the other passwords.

4. METHOD

Participants

Fifty-four undergraduate, graduate students and staff members participated in this
study. They were recruited through an email or a verbal invitation describing the
experimental study. Students interested in participating were pre-screened via
questionnaire to determine their eligibility. To be eligible, participants should have had
prior experience using the Internet for a minimum of one year and in constructing
passwords for user accounts on the Web. The 54 participants were randomly divided into
three groups, 18 in Condition 1 who were assigned alphanumeric system-generated
passwords of 6 characters, each randomly selected from any of the 36 alphanumeric
characters available on the standard QWERTY keyboard; 18 in Condition 2 creating
passwords of a minimum of 8 characters composed of at least one lower case and one
upper case letter, a number and a special character, subject to a dictionary check; and 18
participants in Condition 3 creating passwords with a minimum of 16 characters of any
type characters, subject to a dictionary check. For Condition 1, prior to the experimental
study, 40 Clemson University students were surveyed. This questionnaire asked
respondents to rank three assigned alphanumeric system-generated passwords that varied
in terms of character sets used and length but shared similar entropies (see Appendix G).
They were asked to rank their most preferred form as one and their least preferred as
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three. Statistical analysis of the responses indicated that 6-character alphanumeric
system-generated passwords were preferred compared to 5 character completely random
system-generated passwords and 7-character lower-case letter passwords. Based on these
results, the 6-character alphanumeric password was selected as the system-generated
password for the experimental study.

Testing Environment

This study was conducted in the Human Computer Systems Laboratory in Freeman
Hall. The experimental set-up consisted of a desktop computer, table, chair, paper and
pencil. The participants were assigned a 6-character alphanumeric password or asked to
create a password by entering it into a popup window generated by the application using
the guidelines provided. Those participants who created passwords were also given
instructions on memory aids such as mnemonics and passphrases. The computer
presented a password login application into which all 54 participants in the experimental
study entered their passwords during the first session. This application provided
immediate feedback on whether the passwords created conformed to the stipulated
password policies before storing them. The participants were then asked to take a fiveminute break, engaging themselves in a distraction task. The objective of the task was to
reach the highest score in a game of Angry Birds (Rovio Entertainment Ltd., 2009). If the
participants reached the highest score before five minutes, they were asked to continue to
the next level of the game. At the end of the break, the participants were given five
opportunities to enter their password. During the second session of the study, the
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participants used the password login application to enter the passwords they were
assigned or had created in the first session with a maximum of five attempts permitted.
The researcher was present in the laboratory with the participants to provide guidance
during both sessions.

Experimental Design

This experiment is considered to be both a one-factor design with three levels and a
two-factor design with two or three levels. The independent variable of the former
investigates the password composition scheme at the three levels defined in Table 4.1
below:
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Table 4.1: Three levels of password composition
Condition 1
6 characters
Alphanumeric
characters selected
from any of the 36
characters
available on the
standard
QWERTY
keyboard
System-generated
and assigned
No common words
or repeated
character
sequences of
length three or
greater or
permutations of
usernames

Condition 2

Condition 31

Minimum of 8
characters

Minimum of 16
characters

Characters selected
from any of the 94
characters available
on the standard
QWERTY keyboard

Characters selected
from any of the 94
characters available
on the standard
QWERTY
keyboard

At least one lower
and one upper case
letter, one number
and one special
character

User-generated

No common words
or repeated
character sequences
No common words
of length three or
or repeated character greater or
sequences of length permutations of
usernames
three or greater or
permutations of
usernames
User-generated

1

(Burr et al., 2006)

However, for dependent variables recorded two or three times over task sessions, the
experiment was a two-factor design with two or three levels. The second independent
variable of the study were the task sessions defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below:
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Table 4.2: 3x3 factorial design

IVs

Task Session 1:

Task Session 1:

Task Session 2:

Creation

Recall

Recall

Condition 1
Condition 2
Condition 3

Table 4.3: 3x2 factorial design

IVs

Session 1: Recall

Session 2: Recall

Condition 1
Condition 2
Condition 3

All three password schemes resulted in passwords that possess a minimum guessing
entropy of 30±2 bits (Burr et al., 2006). According to NIST guidelines (Burr et al., 2006),
passwords of 16 characters or more do not need dictionary checks. However, we included
a dictionary check for Condition 3 for consistency purposes. The dependent variables
included objective and subjective measures of performance for each participant.

The objective measures for the first session consisted of the time taken to create an
account and a password, the error rate during creation, the recall login error rates and the
recall time. These error rates were calculated by dividing the total number of incorrect
attempts by the total attempts made to complete the task. Additionally, the Damerau-
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Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities of the incorrectly recalled passwords for each
participant were recorded per recall session. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance between
the recalled password and the stored password is the minimum number of operations, i.e.
addition, subtraction, substitution or transposition, needed to transform the recalled
password to the stored password. The Jaro-Winkler distance is a measure of similarity
between the recalled password and the stored password. The objective measures in the
second session included the recall login error rates, the recall time and the DamerauLevenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities of incorrectly recalled passwords for each
participant.

Subjective data were obtained through the System Usability Scale (SUS) (see
Appendix D) administered to the participants at the end of each session of the
experimental study. The questionnaire at the end of the first session addressed the ease of
creating the password and the ease-of-use and memorability of the passwords for this
session; the questionnaire administered to the participants at the end of the second session
addressed the memorability of the passwords created. In addition, at the end of each
session, the NASA-TLX questionnaire (see Appendix E) was administered to the
participants to measure mental, physical and temporal workload as well as the
performance, effort and frustration component of the workload.

The data collected for each dependent measure were statistically analyzed using a oneway analysis of variance or two-way mixed analysis of variance. The locus of any
statistically significant difference was determined using an LSD post-hoc test.
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Tasks
The experimental study was conducted in two sessions. In the first, the participants
performed the following set of tasks:

1) Condition 1 participants received a 6-character alphanumeric password generated
by the application on a pop-up window. See Figure 4.1.
2) Participants in Conditions 2 and 3 were provided a set of guidelines to create a
password according to the password composition scheme assigned to them. See
Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
3) The usernames for the participants were automatically generated and prepopulated in the popup window above the space for the password entry.
4) These assigned or created passwords were entered into the same popup window in
the space provided.
5) After the entry of the passwords, all participants checked the feedback provided
by the password login application.
6) If the feedback indicated that the password did not conform to the one that was
assigned or to its requirements, Step 4 was repeated. See Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
7) If the password entered was correct, the participants were asked to take a fiveminute break in which they played the computer game Angry Birds (Rovio
Entertainment Ltd., 2009).
8) After the break, the participants logged in using their assigned or created
passwords. A total of five attempts were permitted for entering the password
correctly for the first time. See Figures 4.7 and 4.8.
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9) On entering the password successfully or exhausting all five recall attempts, the
participants completed the System Usability Scale (SUS) and the NASA-TLX
questionnaire

The participants were asked to return 5 to 7 days later, depending on their availability,
to determine the memorability of their passwords by performing the following tasks:

1) All participants entered the password they were assigned or that they created in
the first session into the login application.
2) A total of five attempts were permissible for entering the password correctly.
3) On entering the password successfully for the first time, the participants
completed the System Usability Scale (SUS) and the NASA-TLX questionnaire.
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Figure 4.1: 6-character alphanumeric password creation
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Figure 4.2: 8-character password creation
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Figure 4.3: 16-character password creation
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Figure 4.4: Response popup window for failed 6-character alphanumeric password
creation
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Figure 4.5: Response popup window for failed 8-character password creation
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Figure 4.6: Response popup window for failed 16-character password creation
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Figure 4.7: Password recall pop-up window
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Figure 4.8: Failed password recall attempt

Procedure
At the beginning of the first session, the researcher greeted the participants, who were
then seated in front of a desktop computer on a table in the Human Computer Systems
Laboratory. The researcher provided a brief overview of the experiment to the
participants. After the participants read and signed the informed consent form (see
Appendix A), they completed a pre-study questionnaire (see Appendix B) asking for
demographics, information on their Internet experience and their previous experience in
creating user accounts on the Internet. On completion of the pre-study questionnaire, the
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researcher provided training on memory tools such as mnemonics and passphrases for
Conditions 2 and 3, and the types of passwords that would not be accepted by a
dictionary check for Conditions 2 and 3 (see Appendix C). These techniques could be
used to assist in the creation and memorization of passwords. The duration of this
training was approximately 5 minutes. The participants were then asked to memorize the
passwords that they would be assigned or that they would create to avoid externalizing
them.

After the completion of training, the participants were either assigned or they created
passwords conforming to the password guidelines they were provided. They then
subsequently entered them into the password login application on the desktop computer.
The application provided immediate feedback as to correctness in the assigned password
condition. In the user-generated password conditions, the application provided feedback
as to whether the passwords created conformed to the required guidelines. Participants
who failed were asked to re-create the passwords. The time taken and the number of
errors committed during the creation of correct passwords in the first session were
recorded. After a five-minute break, the participants entered the passwords assigned or
created into the application, with five attempts allowed. The time taken to recall the
password and the login error rates were recorded. On completion of this task, the
participants were asked to complete the System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire (see
Appendix D). These questions use a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Then, each participant was administered the NASA Task
Load Index questionnaire to assess the performance, effort, frustration, mental, physical
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and temporal demands experienced during the creation of the password (see Appendix
E). At the end of the session, the researcher asked the participant to schedule a date and
time for the second session of the experimental study. The duration of the first phase of
the study was approximately thirty minutes.

At the beginning of the second session, the researcher briefed the participants on the
task to be completed. The researcher asked them to recall their passwords from the first
session and to enter them into the password login application on the desktop computer.
The time taken to recall the password was recorded. A maximum of five attempts was
allowed for to the participants to recall their passwords correctly; if the participants failed
to be able to do so in five attempts, the password was specified as unrecoverable. The
Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities for the unsuccessful attempts were
recorded.

The participants were asked to complete the System Usability Scale

questionnaire (see Appendix D). The researcher then administered the NASA Task Load
Index questionnaire to the participants to assess the performance, effort, frustration,
mental, physical and temporal demands experienced during the login task (see Appendix
E). The duration of the second phase was approximately 20 minutes. See procedure flow
for first and second session in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Procedure flow for first and second session
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5. RESULTS

The data collected across all the task sessions for all the participants were screened
and checked for the normality. These results showed that the times taken to create
password accounts in the first session, the recall times in the first and second sessions,
and the edit distances of Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler in the second session
were non-normal with high skewness values. The data from these dependent variables
were then transformed using the reciprocal function to normalize them.
The results were subsequently subjected to one-way or two-way mixed ANOVA,
depending on whether the dependent variable was measured once or more than once the
over task sessions. One-way ANOVA was applied to the three password policy
conditions for the time taken to create passwords accounts (including memorizing and
entering the password into the login application), the password creation error rates, and
the Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winker edit distances. The Damerau-Levenshtein and
Jaro-Winker edit distances for the first recall session were recorded for the fifty-six
participants who successfully recalled their passwords within five attempts.
Consequently, one-way ANOVA of the Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winker edit
distances for the first recall session or a two-way mixed ANOVA could not be conducted
due to the unequal sample size of participants in the first session.
Two-way mixed ANOVA was applied for the three password policy conditions across
the two task sessions for the time taken to recall the passwords and for the recall error
rates as well as for the subjective ratings from the NASA-TLX metrics and the System
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Usability Scale (SUS) scores. The second independent variable, task session, involved
two levels (the first session recall and the second session recall task) or three levels (the
first session password creation task and the first and the second session recall tasks),
depending on whether the measures of the dependent variables were repeated. More
specifically, the time taken to recall the password and the recall error rates had two levels
for each task session, i.e. recall task in first and second session. The subjective measures,
NASA-TLX indices and the SUS scores had three levels for each task session, i.e.
password creation task in first session and recall task in first and second session.
Objective Measures
The objective measures recorded for the first session were the time taken to create a
password account and the error rates for password creation. For both sessions, the time
taken to recall the password, the recall error rate and the edit distances were recorded.
Time taken to create a password account. The time taken to create a password
account in the first session includes the time taken to receive an assigned password or to
create a password, to memorize the assigned/created passwords and to enter the
passwords into the application. These steps were measured from the time a password was
assigned or requested to be created to the time the account was created. The descriptive
statistics for this metric are provided in Table 5.1. Mean, standard deviation and error in
the table are transposed (reciprocal) values of the original time recorded in seconds:

41

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value of password account creation
time
Creation Time

N

Mean

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.0278

0.01612

0.00380

8-character

18

0.0191

0.00979

0.00231

16-character

18

0.0131

0.00634

0.00150

Total

54

0.0200

0.01280

0.00174

A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password
policy conditions on the time taken to create a password account. The results indicated
this effect was significant, F(2, 51)=7.395, p=0.002. Subsequent post-hoc analysis
revealed that the time to create a password account was less for the system-generated
passwords than for either the 8-character (p=0.028) or the 16-character passwords
(p<0.001). There was no statistically significant difference between the 8-character and
the 16-character password. The one-way ANOVA table for the transposed value of the
time taken to create password accounts is provided in Table 5.2, and the original and
reflected transposed values of creation time are plotted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. These
reflected transposed values were obtained by subtracting the transposed values from a
constant so that bar graphs are in the same direction as the original values:
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Table 5.2: One-way ANOVA data for the transposed value of account creation time
Creation Time

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Between Groups

.002

2

.001

Within Groups

.007

51

.000

Total

.009

53

7.395 0.002

Figure 5.1: Mean password account creation time (seconds)
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Figure 5.22: Reflected transposed values for password account creation time
2

(The transposed values are reflected in this graph so that the higher values correspond to

the longer creation time)
Password creation error rates. Password creation error rates, which measure the
number of attempts taken to create an account conforming to the password policy
condition, were measured by dividing the number of errors by the total number of
attempts taken to create the password account. The descriptive statistics for this metric
are provided in Table 5.3:
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for error rates during password account creation
Error Rate

N

Mean

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.0000

0.000000

0.0000

8-character

18

0.2130

0.278983

0.06575

16-character

18

0.1111

0.213896

0.05041

Total

54

0.1080

0.217598

0.02961

A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password
policy condition on password creation error rates. The results indicated that this effect
was significant, F(2, 51)=4.959, p=0.011. Subsequent post-hoc analysis revealed that the
error rate for creating a password account was lower for the system-generated passwords
than for the 8-character (p=0.003). However, there was no significant difference between
the system-generated and 16-character passwords (p > 0.05) or the 8-character and 16character passwords (p > 0.05). The one-way ANOVA error rates are shown in Table 5.4,
and the mean error rates are plotted in Figure 5.3.
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Table 5.4: One-way ANOVA data for error rates
Error Rate

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Between Groups

.409

2

.204

Within Groups

2.101

51

.041

Total

2.509

53

4.959 0.011

Figure 5.3: Mean error rates during creation of password accounts
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Time taken to recall passwords. The time taken to recall the password, which
includes the time taken to enter the passwords into the login application, was measured
from the time the login application appeared to the time the participants completed the
task. The descriptive statistics for this metric for both sessions are provided in Tables 5.5
and 5.6. Mean, standard deviation and error in the table are the transposed (reciprocal)
values of the original time recorded in seconds:
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value for the recall times for first
session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall Times

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.1542

.05008

0.01181

8-character

18

0.0802

.05369

0.01266

16-character

18

0.0627

.03346

0.00789

Total

54

0.0990

.06074

0.00827
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value for the recall times for second
session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall Times

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.0859

.06584

0.01552

8-character

18

0.0552

.03805

0.00897

16-character

18

0.0555

.03549

0.00837

Total

54

0.0655

.04970

0.00676

A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of
the password policy conditions and the task sessions on the time taken to recall the
passwords. The result indicated that the main effect was significant for both tasks, F(1,
51)=15.634, p<0.001 and password creation condition F(2, 51)=15.170, p<0.001.
Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the task session main effect revealed that the time taken
to recall a password was less for the first session than for the second (p<0.001). Analysis
of the password creation condition main effect revealed that the time taken to recall a
password was less for the system-generated passwords than for either the 8-character
(p<0.001) or the 16-character passwords (p<0.001). The difference between the 8character and 16-character password condition was not significant. The two-way mixed
ANOVA data for the transposed value of the recall times are provided in Table 5.7:
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Table 5.7: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for recall times
Recall Times

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Task Sessions

.030

1

.030

15.634

0.000

Conditions

0.078

2

.039

15.170

0.000

Task Sessions x Conditions

0.018

2

.009

4.584

0.015

Error (Within-subjects)

.099

51

.002

Error (Between-subjects)

.132

51

.003

The interaction effect of password policy conditions and task sessions on the time
taken to recall passwords was significant, F(2, 51)=4.584, p=0.015. The interaction
effects are plotted in Figure 5.4 and 5.5. Subsequent simple effects analysis of this
interaction revealed that the time taken to recall a password in the first recall session was
less for the system-generated passwords than for both the 8-character passwords
(p<0.001) and the 16-character passwords (p<0.001). The results showed no significant
difference between the 8-character and 16-character password conditions (p >0.05).
There was no statistical significance across password conditions in the second session. A
repeated measure ANOVA was conducted for the simple effect analysis to test the effect
of task session on the time taken to recall system-generated passwords, 8-character
passwords and 16-character passwords. The results indicated the effect of the task session
on the system-generated passwords was significant, F(1, 17)=17.527, (p=0.001). Post-hoc
analysis revealed that the time taken to recall system-generated passwords for the first
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session was lower than for the second session (p=0.001). The effects of task sessions on
the time taken to recall 8-character and 16-character passwords were not significant.
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Figure 5.4: Interaction effect plots of the time taken to recall password (seconds)
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Figure 5.53: Interaction effect plots of the reflected transformed values of time taken to
recall
3

(The transposed values are reflected in these graphs so that the higher values correspond

to the longer recall time)
Recall error rates. The error rates, which specify the number of attempts taken to
recall passwords in both sessions, were measured by dividing the number of errors by the
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total number of attempts taken to recall the password. The descriptive statistics for this
metric are provided in Tables 5.8 and 5.9:
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics for recall error rates for first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Error Rates

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.000

.00000

0.00000

8-character

18

0.21761

.28748

0.06776

16-character

18

0.12967

.25288

0.05960

Total

54

0.11567

.23486

0.31961

Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics for recall error rates for second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Error Rates

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

0.2777

.42779

0.10083

8-character

18

0.30094

.41139

0.09696

16-character

18

0.20372

.35956

0.08475

Total

54

0.26081

.39523

0.05378

A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of
the password policy conditions and the recall task sessions on recall error rates. The
results of this analysis were significant for task sessions, F(1, 51)=5.274, p=0.026 but not
significant for password policy conditions. Post-hoc analysis of the main effect of the
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task session revealed that the recall error rate was lower for the first recall session than
for the second (p=0.026). The interaction effect of password policy condition and recall
task session on recall error rates was not significant (p>0.05). The two-way mixed
ANOVA for error rates is provided in Table 5.10:
Table 5.10: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for recall error rates
Error Rates

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Task Sessions

.568

1

.568

5.274

0.026

Conditions

0.286

2

.143

1.407

0.254

Task Sessions x Conditions

0.238

2

.119

1.106

0.339

Error (Within-subjects)

5.493

51

.108

Error (Between-subjects)

5.185

51

.102

The descriptive statistics for recall error rates in the first session show that there were
no errors in recalling system-generated passwords. This suggests that there must be a
significant difference across password policy conditions in the first session. A one-way
between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password policy
conditions on recall error rates in the first session. The results indicated this effect was
significant, F(2, 51)=4.414, p=0.012. This result should, however, be interpreted
cautiously because the variance of recall error rates for system-generated passwords in
the first session was zero. Zero variability violates the assumptions of the analytical
techniques employed. The interaction effects are plotted in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Interaction effect plots for recall error rates

Unrecoverable passwords. Three system-generated, three 8-character and two 16character passwords could not be recalled in the first session. In the second session, four
system-generated, three 8-character and two 16-character passwords could not be
recalled.
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The Fisher Exact Probability test was conducted to explore possible significant
difference in the number of unrecoverable password across password policy conditions in
the second session. The analysis used a conservative p-value of 0.897, revealing no
statistically significant difference.
Edit distances. The edit distances were recorded in both sessions of the recall tasks
when participants failed to recall their passwords. However, since participants were
required to recall their passwords in the first session, participants who failed to do so
were replaced by new ones. Consequently, only edit distances for the second session
were statistically analyzed.
Damerau-Levenshtein edit distances. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance between
the recalled and the stored passwords is the minimum number of operations needed to
transform recalled passwords into those stored. From the incorrectly recalled passwords
in the second session, the four system-generated recorded values were 4, 6, 1 and 1; the
three 8-character passwords recorded of values were 1, 5 and 3; and the two 16-character
passwords recorded values were 3 and 2. The remaining passwords that were correctly
recalled recorded a value of zero.
Data for this dependent variable were non-normal. After reciprocal transformation, the
skewness value remained lower than -2 with a high kurtosis value. These data suggest
that this dependent variable was zero inflated with eighty-three percent of the data being
zero.
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Jaro-Winkler proximities. The Jaro-Winkler distance is a measure of difference
between the stored and the recalled passwords. From the incorrectly recalled passwords
in the second session, the four system-generated recorded values were 0.000, 0.944,
0.944 and 0.889; the three 8-character passwords recorded of values were 0.917, 0.778
and 0.963; and two 16-character passwords recorded values were 0.946 and 0.931. The
remaining passwords that were correctly recalled recorded a value of one.
Data for this dependent variable were also non-normal. After reciprocal
transformation, the skewness value remained higher than +2 along with a high kurtosis
value. These data suggest that this dependent variable was one inflated with eighty-three
percent of the data being one.
Subjective Measures
NASA Task Load Indices. The NASA-TLX assesses workload on six 7-point scales
of mental, physical and temporal loads, performance, effort, and frustration with low and
high end points. The NASA-TLX questionnaires were administered at the end of each
task session, i.e., after first session--creation, first session--recall and second session-recall. The description of each subscale is provided in Table 5.11.
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Title
Mental Demand

Physical Demand

Temporal Demand

Performance

Effort

Frustration

Endpoints

Descriptions

Low/High

How much mental and perceptual activity was
required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating,
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the
task easy or demanding, simple or complex,
exacting or forgiving?

Low/High

How much physical activity was required (e.g.,
pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating,
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious?

Low/High

How much time pressure did you feel due to the
rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid
and frantic?

Good/Poor

How successful do you think you were in
accomplishing the goals of the task set by the
experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were
you with your performance in accomplishing these
goals?

Low/High

Low/High

How hard did you have to work (mentally and
physically) to accomplish your level of
performance?

How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and
annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed
and complacent did you feel during the task?

Table 5.11: NASA-TLX rating scale definitions (Hart, 2006)
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Mental Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the mental
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results
indicated that main effects were not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)=2.059,
p>0.05 for task sessions and F(2, 51)=2.268, p>0.05 for password policy. The interaction
effect was also not significant, sphericity assumed, F(4, 102)=1.155, p>0.05. The
descriptive statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for mental demand are provided
in Tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15:
Table 5.12: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

3.00

1.372

0.323

8-character

18

4.00

1.749

0.412

16-character

18

3.89

1.779

0.419

Total

54

3.63

1.674

0.228
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Table 5.13: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.56

1.464

0.345

8-character

18

3.83

1.948

0.459

16-character

18

2.72

2.109

0.497

Total

54

2.04

1.913

0.260

Table 5.14: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during recall in second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

3.33

2.000

0.471

8-character

18

3.83

1.823

0.430

16-character

18

2.89

2.220

0.523

Total

54

3.35

2.020

0.275
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Table 5.15: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for mental demand
Mental Demand

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Task Sessions

9.494

2

4.747

2.059

0.133

Conditions

25.568

2

12.784

2.268

0.114

Task Sessions x Conditions

10.654

4

2.664

1.155

0.335

Error (Within-subject)

235.185

102

2.306

5.185

51

5.636

Error (Between-subject)
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Figure 5.7: Mean rating for mental demand
Physical Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the physical
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results
indicated the main effects were not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)=0.567,
p>0.05 for task sessions and F(2, 51)=1.126, p>0.05 for password conditions. The
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interaction effect was not significant, sphericity assumed, F(4, 102)=0.693, p>0.05. The
descriptive statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for physical demand are provided
in Tables 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19:
Table 5.16: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.89

1.183

0.279

8-character

18

2.06

1.162

0.274

16-character

18

1.61

1.037

0.244

Total

54

1.85

1.123

0.153

Table 5.17: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.33

.767

0.181

8-character

18

2.06

1.392

0.328

16-character

18

1.67

1.138

0.268

Total

54

1.69

1.146

0.156
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Table 5.18: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during recall in second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.72

1.179

0.278

8-character

18

2.00

1.237

0.291

16-character

18

1.83

1.043

0.246

Total

54

1.85

1.139

0.155

Table 5.19: Two-way mixed ANOVA table for physical demand
Physical Demand

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Task Sessions

1.000

2

0.500

0.567

0.569

Conditions

4.778

2

2.389

1.126

0.332

Task Sessions x Conditions

2.444

4

0.661

0.693

0.598

Error (Within-subjects)

89.889

102

0.881

Error (Between-subjects)

108.167

51

2.121
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Figure 5.8: Mean rating for physical demand
Temporal Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the temporal
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results
indicated that the main effect of task session approached significance, Wilks’ Lambda,
F(2, 50)=2.723, p=0.075. The main effect for password policy was significant, F(2,
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51)=4.860, p=0.012. Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the task session main effect
revealed that the temporal demand was higher during the creation of the password
account than for the recall of the same password in the same session (p=0.039). There
was no significant difference between the recall of the password in the first and second
sessions (p>0.05). Post-hoc analysis of the main effects of password policy revealed that
the temporal demand was higher for the 8-character user-generated passwords than for
system-generated passwords (p=0.003). The interaction effect was not significant, Wilks’
Lambda, F( 4, 100)=0.072, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and two-way mixed
ANOVA data for temporal demand are provided in Table 5.20, 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23.

Table 5.20: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.17

1.249

0.294

8-character

18

3.28

1.742

0.4113

16-character

18

2.67

1.715

0.404

Total

54

2.70

1.621

0.221
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Table 5.21: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.83

1.425

0.336

8-character

18

2.89

1.779

0.419

16-character

18

2.11

1.278

0.301

Total

54

2.28

1.547

0.211

Table 5.22: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during recall in second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.72

0.826

0.195

8-character

18

2.72

1.674

0.394

16-character

18

2.22

1.865

0.440

Total

54

2.22

1.550

0.211
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Table 5.23: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for temporal demand
Temporal Demand

df

F

Sig.

Task Sessions

2

2.723

0.075

Conditions

2

4.860

0.012

Task Sessions x Conditions

4

0.072

0.990

Error (Within-subjects)

100

Error (Between-subjects)

51

Error (Task Sessions)

50

Figure 5.9: Mean rating for temporal demand
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Performance.

A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and

interaction effects of password policy and task session on the performance component of
the NASA-TLX while creating and recalling passwords. The results indicated the main
effect of the task session was significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=7.058, p=0.002 and
main effect of the password policy was not significant, F(2, 51)=2.405, p>0.05.
Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the within-subject main effects revealed that the
performance component was higher for the creation of the password account than for the
recall of the same password in the same session (p=0.002) and higher for recall in the
second session than for recall in the first session (p=0.019). The interaction effect was not
significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(4, 100)=0.582, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and twoway mixed ANOVA data for performance are provided in Tables 5.24, 5.25, 5.26 and
5.27:
Table 5.24: Descriptive statistics for performance during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.28

1.406

0.331

8-character

18

2.83

1.581

0.373

16-character

18

2.11

1.605

0.378

Total

54

2.41

1.536

0.209
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Table 5.25: Descriptive statistics for performance during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.50

1.339

0.316

8-character

18

2.39

1.614

0.380

16-character

18

1.56

1.294

0.305

Total

54

1.81

1.455

0.198

Table 5.26: Descriptive statistics for performance during recall in second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.72

2.469

0.582

8-character

18

3.06

2.235

0.527

16-character

18

1.78

1.734

0.409

Total

54

2.52

2.196

0.299
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Table 5.27: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for performance
Performance

df

F

Sig.

Task Sessions

2

7.058

0.002

Conditions

2

2.405

0.100

Task Sessions x Conditions

4

0.582

0.676

Error (Within-subjects)

100

Error (Between-subjects)

51

Error (Task Sessions)

50
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Figure 5.10: Mean rating for performance
Effort. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction
effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the effort required by the
participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results indicated that the main
effects were not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=1.661, p>0.05 for the task session
and F(2, 51)=1.817, p>0.05 for the password policy. The interaction effect was also not
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significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(4, 100)=0.827, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and twoway mixed ANOVA data for effort are provided in Tables 5.28, 5.29, 5.30 and 5.31:
Table 5.28: Descriptive statistics for effort during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.83

1.425

0.336

8-character

18

3.22

1.734

0.409

16-character

18

3.17

1.505

0.355

Total

54

3.07

1.540

0.210

Table 5.29: Descriptive statistics for effort during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.06

1.259

0.297

8-character

18

3.33

1.879

0.443

16-character

18

2.72

1.742

0.411

Total

54

2.70

1.700

0.231
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Table 5.30: Descriptive statistics for effort during recall in second session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.78

1.734

0.409

8-character

18

3.50

1.757

0.414

16-character

18

2.89

2.026

0.478

Total

54

3.06

1.837

0.250

Table 5.31: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for effort
Effort

df

F

Sig.

Task Sessions

2

1.661

0.200

Conditions

2

1.817

0.173

Task Sessions x Conditions

4

0.827

0.511

Error (Within-subjects)

100

Error (Between-subjects)

51

Error (Task Sessions)

50
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Figure 5.11: Mean rating for effort
Frustration. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the frustration
experienced by the participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results
indicated that main effects were not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=0.235, p>0.05
for the task session and F(2, 51)=2.037, p>0.05 for the password policy. The interaction
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effect was also not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F( 4, 100)=1.147, p>0.05. The descriptive
statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for frustration are provided in Tables 5.32,
5.33, 5.34 and 5.35:
Table 5.32: Descriptive statistics for frustration during password creation
1st Session

N

Mean

Password creation

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.17

1.425

0.336

8-character

18

2.72

1.708

0.403

16-character

18

2.39

1.819

0.429

Total

54

2.43

1.644

0.224

Table 5.33: Descriptive statistics for frustration during recall in first session
1st Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

1.61

1.092

0.257

8-character

18

2.89

1.641

0.387

16-character

18

2.50

1.543

0.364

Total

54

2.33

1.517

0.206
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Table 5.34: Descriptive statistics for frustration during recall in second session
2nd Session

N

Mean

Recall

Standard

Std.

Deviation

Error

System-generated

18

2.06

1.798

0.424

8-character

18

2.56

1.790

0.422

16-character

18

2.06

1.474

0.347

Total

54

2.22

1.679

0.228

Table 5.35: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for frustration
Frustration

df

F

Sig.

Task Sessions

2

0.235

0.791

Conditions

2

2.037

0.141

Task Sessions x Conditions

4

1.147

0.339

Error (Within-subjects)

100

Error (Between-subjects)

51

Error (Task Sessions)

50
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Figure 5.12: Mean rating for frustration
System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire. The System Usability Scale, a ten-item
Likert-scale questionnaire that records global subjective assessment of the usability of a
system, has a range of scores from 0-100. The SUS questionnaires were administered at
the end of each task, i.e., 1st session--creation, 1st session--recall and 2nd session--recall.
Refer to tables 5.36, 5.37 and 5.38:
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Table 5.36: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password account creation
1st Session-Creation

N

Mean

SUS score

Standard
Deviation

System-generated

18

63.4722

19.65023

8-character

18

68.0556

16.19176

16-character

18

66.1111

17.55710

Total

54

65.8796

17.61858

Table 5.37: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password recall in first session
2nd Session-Recall

N

Mean

SUS score

Standard
Deviation

System-generated

18

56.6667

23.68606

8-character

18

61.9444

16.63968

16-character

18

61.8056

21.31358

Total

54

60.1389

20.50895
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Table 5.38: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password recall in second session
1st Session

N

Mean

Error Rates

Standard
Deviation

System-generated

18

56.5278

19.38653

8-character

18

62.0833

18.03285

16-character

18

66.5278

21.43970

Total

54

61.7130

19.73183

A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of
the password policy conditions and the task sessions on system usability while creating
and recalling passwords. The results indicated that the main effect of task session was
significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)= 3.766, p=0.026. The main effect of password
policy was not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 51)=0.633, p>0.05. Post-hoc analysis
of the task session main effect revealed that the SUS score was higher during the creation
of the password account than during the recall of the same password in the same session
(p=0.007). There were no significant differences between other task sessions. The
interaction effect was not significant, sphericity assumed, F( 4, 102)=0.597, p>0.05. The
two-way mixed ANOVA data for the SUS scores are provided in Table 5.39.
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Table 5.39: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for SUS score
SUS score

SS

df

Mean

F

Sig.

Squares
Task Sessions

950.309

2

475.154

3.766

0.026

Conditions

1118.596

2

559.298

0.633

0.535

Task Sessions x Conditions

301.312

4

75.328

0.597

0.666

Error (Within-subjects)

89.889

102

126.169

45090.856

51

884.134

Error (Between-subjects)
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Figure 5.13: Mean SUS for creation task
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Figure 5.14: Mean SUS for second session recall
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Figure 5.15: Mean SUS for second session recall
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6. DISCUSSION

Overall, the results from this study supported one hypothesis, that it would take less
time to create an account with the system-generated password than with the other two
password conditions; however, the remaining hypotheses were not supported.
Significant differences were found in error rates for the creation of passwords, the time
taken to recall the password, error rates during recall and temporal demand across
password conditions. Across task sessions, the time taken to recall system-generated
passwords, the error rates during recall, the performance index of the NASA-TLX and
the SUS scores were found to be significantly different. The overall relative performance
among password policy conditions for dependent variables during each task sessions is
provided in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3:
Table 6.1: Relative performance of policy conditions during password account creation
Dependent Variables

Time take to create password account

Systemgenerated
password
Low

8character
password
Medium

16character
password
High

Password account creation error rates

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Mental Demand: Password creation

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Physical Demand: Password
creation
NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: Password
creation
NASA TLX-Performance: Password creation

Medium

High

Low

Low

High

Medium

Medium

Poor

Good

NASA TLX-Effort: Password creation

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Frustration: Password creation

Low

High

Medium

SUS Score- Password creation

Low

High

Medium
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Table 6.2: Relative performance of policy conditions during first session recall
Dependent Variables

Time taken to recall passwords: First session

Systemgenerated
password
Low

8character
password
Medium

16character
password
High

Recall error rates in the first session

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Mental Demand: First session recall Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Physical Demand: First session
recall
NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: First session
recall
NASA TLX-Performance: First session recall

Low

High

Medium

Low

High

Medium

Good

Poor

Medium

NASA TLX-Effort: First session recall

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Frustration: First session recall

Low

High

Medium

SUS Score- First session recall

Low

High

Medium
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Table 6.3: Relative performance of policy conditions during second session recall
Dependent Variables

Time taken to recall password: Second session

Systemgenerated
password
Low

8character
password
High

16character
password
Medium

Recall error rates in the second session

Medium

High

Low

Damerau-Levenshtein edit distances

High

Medium

Low

Jaro-Winkler proximities

Low

Medium

High

Unrecoverable password: Second session

High

Medium

Low

NASA TLX-Mental Demand: Second session
recall

Medium

High

Low

NASA TLX-Physical Demand: Second session
recall

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: Second
session recall

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Performance: Second session

Medium

Poor

Good

NASA TLX-Effort: Second session recall

Low

High

Medium

NASA TLX-Frustration: Second session recall

Low

High

Low

SUS Score- Second session recall

Low

Medium

High

recall

Password Account Creation
It took significantly less time to create an account with the system-generated
password, followed by the 8-character and the 16-chararacter passwords. The reason the
latter two passwords took longer is likely because of the two stages required for account
creation with user-generated passwords, i.e. the participants had to both create and
memorize their passwords while complying with the restrictions presented. In contrast,
the creation of the system-generated password account involved only memorization of an
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assigned 6-character alphanumeric password. These findings are partially supported by
the study conducted by Proctor et al. (2002), who found that the time taken to create
passwords with only a minimum length restriction was less than for passwords of the
same minimum length but with additional restrictions.
In addition, the participants who were assigned system-generated passwords
committed no errors during the creation of their password accounts. While the
participants who created 16-character passwords committed fewer errors than those
creating 8-character passwords, this difference was not statistically significant. The
participants required to generate their own passwords may have committed more errors
because they failed to comprehend fully the restrictions imposed on their passwords
during their first attempts to create one. Participants perhaps employed the creation
password strategies they use in the wild; these may have conflicted with the restrictions
imposed by this study. This explanation is further substantiated by the fact that 22 of the
36 participants in the 8-character and 16-character conditions stated at the end of the first
session that they habitually used a specific strategy to create user-generated passwords.
The observation that the participants creating 16-character passwords committed
fewer errors than those creating 8-character passwords, though not statistically
significant, is consistent with that of Komanduri et al. (2011). In the Komanduri et al.
(2011) study, the participants creating 8-character restricted passwords had difficulty
determining whether their password was a dictionary word without entering it. As a
result, they took more than one attempt to create it. The 16-character passwords did not
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have any such restrictions in the Komanduri et al. (2011) study, and the participants took
fewer attempts to create them.
The effect of password policy on temporal demand was significant. Post-hoc analysis
revealed that 8-character passwords incurred higher temporal demand than the systemgenerated ones. This finding could be the result of the higher number of restrictions
placed on the creation of 8-character passwords compared to the other two conditions.
Participants creating these passwords may have felt under greater time pressure to
complete the password creation task in a reasonable amount of time even though no time
constraints were placed on them by the study.
Recall Task in First Session
When the recall data were analyzed across both sessions, the main effects of password
policy and task session as well as their interaction were found to be significant. The
interaction effect was further analyzed using simple effects analysis, which revealed that
the system-generated passwords took less time to recall than either the 8-character or 16character passwords in the 1st session. One of the reasons for this result is that all of the
participant assigned system-generated passwords recalled their passwords successfully on
their first attempt. This was not the case for the participants using self-generated
passwords.
The fact that users of the system-generated password committed no recall errors in the
first session suggested a potentially significant difference compared to the other
conditions. To explore this possibility further, a between-subject one-way ANOVA of the
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effect of password policy conditions on error rates in the first session was conducted.
This analysis revealed statistically significant differences across conditions. However,
this result may be an artifact caused by the zero variance in the recall error rates for the
system-generated password.
Recall Task in Second Session
Four participants could not recall their system-generated passwords in the second
session; three could not remember their 8-character passwords, and two could not
remember their 16-character passwords. Although this trend supports the hypothesis that
16-character passwords would have the fewest unrecoverable passwords, this difference
is not statistically significant. This finding is partially consistent with the results found by
Komanduri et al. (2011), who determined that there was no statistically significant
difference in the number participants who failed to recall their user-generated passwords
across password conditions.
One of the reasons for the lack of significance could be the better-than-expected recall
of system-generated passwords. Informal discussion with several participants suggested
that they found six-character alphanumeric passwords similar in nature to their previous
or current passwords. A second reason for the lack of a significant difference in the
number of unrecovered passwords could be the lower-than-expected performance in the
recall of 16-character passwords. Although these passwords could be composed of only
lower-case letters, seventeen of the eighteen participants in this password condition
created passwords that included combinations of upper-case letters, lower-case letters,
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numbers or special characters. Recalling 16-character passwords of such complexity
could be a difficult cognitive task, a conclusion supported by a study conducted by
Zviran et al. (1993) in which the user-generated passwords composed of only lower-case
letters were recalled more frequently than the ones composed of more than one character
set. Ten participants who belonged to the 16-character password condition commented
that they felt that their passwords were more secure when they included characters other
than lower-case letters. These participants were probably not aware that passwords
composed of 16 lower-case letters are secure. Additionally, nine of these eighteen
participants commented that they found the 16-character minimum length to be overly
long.
Difference Across Task Sessions
The simple effects analysis of the interaction effect for the time taken to recall also
revealed that the system-generated passwords took less time to recall in the first session
than in the second. A similar trend was observed for the 8-character user-generated
passwords, but this difference was not significant. Additionally, there was also a
significant difference between the error rates in the 1st and 2nd recall task sessions,
presumably due to the degradation effect of time on memorability.
The Performance index of the NASA-TLX showed a significant effect for task
sessions. This result suggests that the participants may have felt that it is significantly
harder to create password accounts than recalling them after the distraction task in the
first session. The participants may have felt that it was harder to create a password with
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restrictions and then memorize the assigned or created password than to recall the
passwords they created five minutes back, prior to the distraction task. The participants
also indicated that they believed that their performance was significantly poorer during
recall in the second session than in the first. This explanation is supported by the fact that
the recall error rates for the first session were significantly lower than those for the
second, possibly due to the degradation effect of time on memorability.
No statistical significance was found for ease-of-use across password policies. The
descriptive statistics suggested that the usability of system-generated passwords was
lower than that of the other password policies for account creation and for recall in the 1st
and 2nd sessions. All of the SUS scores were in the range of 56 to 68, below the
acceptable SUS score of 70 (Bangor, Kortum & Miller, 2008), indicating all three
password policy conditions are marginally usable. Thus, the task of developing a usable
password policy that is also secure requires further study. However, the SUS scores were
significantly higher during the creation of the password than for the recall task in the
same session. This finding may be associated with the lower error rates in the creation of
a password than for recalling them in the same session.
Qualitative Analysis of Participant Comments
A total of fifty-three comments were recorded from sixty-two participants, including
the eight participants who were replaced in the 1st session. However, a majority of the
comments came from the participants in the 8-character and 16-character password
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conditions. These comments were grouped using an open card sort method. As a result of
this sort, the seven categories seen in Table 6.4 emerged:
Table 6.4: Categories of participant comments
Number of comments
by participants

Categories
Password strategy

22

Secure password composition

10

Password length

8

Less secure password composition

5

Password composition for memorability

4

16-character password case-sensitivity

2

Discomfort using 16-character password

2

The category “Password strategy” had the highest number of comments, twenty-two,
indicating that participants used strategies to create passwords. One of the participants
commented, saying “I try to remember how I created my passwords and not what I
created.” This category was followed by “Secure password composition” with ten
comments, emphasizing that passwords created by combining numbers, lower- or uppercase letters or special characters were considered more secure. The participants in this
category commented, saying “I prefer adding number and special characters to make my
passwords more secure.” The participants were also of the opinion that 16-character
passwords were too lengthy to create, a belief supported by eight comments under the
category “Password length.” One of them commented on the password length of 16-
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character password, saying “This is too long!” indicating bias towards shorter password
length, perhaps 8-character passwords. In addition, the five comments in the “Less secure
password composition” category revealed that the participants thought that the 16character passwords composed of lower-case letters were less secure than the 8-character
passwords. A participant commented on the 16-character password, saying “Although I
knew I had an option of using only lower-case letters, I added number to make it more
secure.” Four comments by participants suggested that including numbers with letters
makes passwords easier to remember. One of the comments for this category was “I
added numbers to my password to help make it more memorable.” Two comments
suggested that the participants were unsure whether the 16-character password condition
was case-sensitive or not. A participant was unsure of the case-sensitivity requirements
and commented, “Do lower- and upper-case of the same letter count as two different
characters?” Two other comments indicated the reluctance of the participants to use 16character passwords. One of the participants commented, saying “I am not used to
creating a 16-character password.”
This analysis perhaps indicated a bias of the participants towards the Clemson
University password policies, which requires a password to have at least one number, a
letter and a special character. These passwords must be at least 8-characters long with no
spaces and no more than two repeated characters. This bias would explain the large
number of comments, twenty-three, indicating the use of a strategy to create passwords.
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Pareto analysis of the frequencies of these seven categories seen in Figure 6.1
revealed that the three most frequently occurring comment categories of comments were
password strategy, secure password composition and password length.

Figure 6.1: Pareto chart analysis
These three categories represented 80 percent of the total number of comments.
Analysis of User-Generated Passwords
An additional analysis of the user-generated passwords was conducted. The average
length of the minimum 8-character passwords in this study was 12.05 characters. All of
these passwords included lower-case letters, upper-case letters, number and special
characters. The average length of the minimum 16-character passwords was 17.61
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characters, with the average number of character sets included being 2.83. This extensive
use of multiple character sets again suggests that the participants either did not
comprehend the 16-character restrictions well or preferred adding more character sets
rather than relying only on lower-case letters alone. Seventeen of the eighteen minimum
16-character passwords were composed of more than lower-case letters. Tables 6.5 and
6.6 list the passwords created by the participants:
Table 6.5: 8-character passwords
Hitman#21

Fr3nchfr!es

Zzyellow#9

aceg1#5I

Harry_Grewal1986

Ummagumma90()

BeingHappyIsEasy123!@#

24Te&01di

Rempasishar1@

Ragam_endral_sahana1

Q!w2e3r4

IA@csmman123

N1keSh*x

Demonicsages@786

Zandubam@30

FluorDaniel123#

ZaMBI@316

iMd0ne++

Table 6.6: 16-character passwords
f@llSemester201!

Mechanical_2010@clemson

!@#caretAker123!@#

pocpoc1poc2poc3poc4

m@thewph1l1p@ng@y1l

ThISvLoNGpWORD16

samurai_09031987

qwertyuilkjhgfds

clemsonpssjul11*

shanpa0320210917

clemson2011mechanical

IwillmissClemson

H12A34S56H78I90M

cuid@iefreeman103

Rgalgalclemson77&&

lijjo@fman0801sirvey

abcdefgh12345678

Aniruddha_1985_5nov
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The 8-charcater and the 16-charcter password had an average of 2.11 and 3 chunks of
information i.e. words/numbers/letters/special characters respectively. The participants
appeared to use password creation based on their previous or current environment,
condition and actions. For example, the password “f@llSemester201!” is based on the
academic calendar and the “lijjo@fman0801sirvey” is based on the first and last name of
participant, the location, the date of the study and the nature of the study, exhibiting the
tendency of the users to create passwords reflecting the current period, environment or
action. Passwords like “ThISvLoNGpWORD16”, “Mechanical_2010@clemson” and
“IwillmissClemson” support the comments that participants use a strategy for creating
passwords, either ones they learned in the past or the ones taught to them during the
creation session. Other passwords like “qwertyuilkjhgfds” were composed of sequences
of characters based on their placement on the keyboard. Except for the password
“qwertyuilkjhgfds,” the 16-character passwords in Table 6.6 mirrored the comments of
the participants in relation to including character sets other than lower-case letters.

7. CONCLUSION

This study compared the usability of three password conditions that assigned or
helped users to generate passwords of approximately equal minimum security, evaluating
the trade-off between the length and the complexity of the passwords. The most
important conclusion of this study is that the performance of the 8-character password
was weaker than that of the system-generated password during the creation of password
accounts and was weaker than the 16-character password in the terms of long-term recall.
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Compliance with the restrictions associated with 8-character passwords strengthen
security, but creates a password that is complex in composition. Thus, with the increase
in applications requiring 8-character password accounts, a user may experience cognitive
load when recalling a password from among competing passwords of similar
composition. However, if a 16-character password is created from a meaningful
combination composed of preferably lower-case letters, it may be more memorable than
8-character passwords subject to multiple restrictions.

Currently, the designers of password applications put most of the responsibility for
creating a secure password on the users, forcing them to comply with a variety of
restrictions. The complexity of such passwords may increase their security, but such
security can also be achieved by increasing the minimum length of the password and
lowering the complexity of these passwords, reducing the cognitive load on users. Thus,
efforts should be taken to educate users on the trade-off between the length and the
complexity of user-generated password. A simpler and longer password can be as secure
as a shorter but more complex one.

Designers should consider developing applications that aid users in creating longer but
more meaningful passwords to reduce the cognitive load for the users. These applications
could implement methods to produce 16-character passwords with meaningful
combinations of letters, making the password more memorable to the user. However, care
should be taken by the designers to avoid explicitly restricting users to lower-case letters
only.
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This study is a first step in exploring usable password conditions of approximately
equal security. Below are suggestions for future research:


Studies involving participants belonging to a wider range of demographics.



Studies in the wild (real setting outside the laboratory) involving more
participants.



Studies on the effect of educating participants on the security of longer passwords
composed of lower-case letters.



Studies involving a longer time period between creation and recall tasks to
validate the results of the long-term recall of passwords across conditions.

101

APPENDICES
Appendix A
Consent form for study participants
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University
Evaluating the usability of system-generated and user-generated passwords of
approximately equal security
Description of the Research and Your Participation
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sourav Bhuyan under the
direction of Dr. Joel Greenstein. The purpose of this research is to evaluate the usability
of passwords, either assigned or created, having approximately 30 bits of entropy (a
measure of the security of the password).
This study will take place over two sessions. Your participation in the first session will
involve being introduced to the research, signing an informed consent form, completing a
pre-test questionnaire, completing tasks according to the instructions from the researcher
and completing post-test questionnaires. You will be asked to return after 5 to 7 days to
complete a second set of tasks and answer post-test questionnaires. These post-test
questionnaires consist of standardized satisfaction and workload surveys.
The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately thirty minutes
for Session One and twenty minutes for Session Two.
Risks and Discomforts
There are no known risks associated with this research.
Potential Benefits
This research may help us to discover more usable and secure methods for generating
passwords.

Protection of Confidentiality
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. Collected data will be stored
securely in 147 Freeman Hall and access will be limited to the investigators. Your
identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result from this study.
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In rare cases, a research study will be evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the
Clemson University Institutional Review Board or the Federal Office for Human
Research Protections, which would require that we share the information we collect from
you. If this happens, the information will only be used to determine if we conducted this
study properly and adequately protected your rights as a participant.
Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate
and you may withdraw your consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way
should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study.
You may choose to stop taking part in this study after today. If you do, we will remove
your information from the study. However, if we have already completed our research
analysis, we will not be able to remove your information from the study.
Contact Information
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or any problems arise, please
contact Dr. Joel Greenstein at Clemson University at 864-656-5649. If you have any
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the
ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071.
Consent
I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.
I give my consent to participate in this study.
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________ Date:
_________________

A copy of this consent form will be given to you.
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Appendix B
PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE

GENERAL

Participant:

______________________ (This will be filled out by the test administrator.)

Age:

______________________

Gender:

Male

Female

EDUCATION

1. Please select your academic level:
Undergraduate student
Graduate student
Other
(Please specify: ____________________________________________)

2. List your major area of study: ____________________________________________

COMPUTER EXPERIENCE

3. How long have you been using computers?
< 1 year

1-2 years

3-5 years

> 5 years (Please specify) ________

3-5 years

> 5 years (Please specify) ________

4. How long have you used passwords?
< 1 year

1-2 years

5. How many unique passwords do you have?
1

2

3

More than 3 (Please specify the number) ________
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Appendix C
Methodologies for remembering passwords*
*Source: Guide to Enterprise Password Management (Draft), NIST Special Publication 800-118 (Draft)

1. Mnemonic Method: A user selects a phrase and extracts a letter from each word
(e.g., the first or second letter of each word), adding numbers or special characters
or both.
Example:
Phrase
Please be my best valentine!

Password
Pbmbval!

This is the worst car I have ever driven in my LIFE!

TitwcIhedimLIFE!

I am definitely your #1 fan.

Iady#1f.

2. Altered Passphrases: A user selects a phrase and alters it to form a derivation of
that phrase.
Example:
Passphrases
to be or not to be

Alternate Passphrases
2.be.0r.n0t@to0.bEE

Dressed to the nines

Dressed*2*the*9z

3. Combining and Altering: A user can combine two or three unrelated words and
change
various letters to numbers or special characters.
Example:
Words
“bank” and “camera”

Password
B@nkC@mera

“mail” and “phone”

m4!lf0N3
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Appendix D
System Usability Scale Questionnaire
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Appendix E
NASA-TLX questionnaire
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Appendix F
Consent form for pilot study participants
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University
Evaluating the usability of system-generated and user-generated passwords of
approximately equal security
Description of the Research and Your Participation
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sourav Bhuyan under the
direction of Dr. Joel Greenstein. The purpose of this study is to record your preference
for different passwords that are system-generated and assigned, having approximately 30
bits of entropy (a measure of security of the password).
Your participation will involve being introduced to the study, signing an informed
consent form, completing demographic questions, and ranking the three passwords in
terms of your preference.
The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately 15 minutes.
Risks and Discomforts
There are no known risks associated with this research.
Potential Benefits
This research may help us to discover more usable and secure methods of generating
passwords.

Protection of Confidentiality
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. Collected data will be stored
securely in 147 Freeman Hall and access will be limited to the investigators. Your
identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result from this study.
In rare cases, a research study will be evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the
Clemson University Institutional Review Board or the Federal Office for Human
Research Protections, which would require that we share the information we collect from
you. If this happens, the information will only be used to determine if we conducted this
study properly and adequately protected your rights as a participant.
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Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate
and you may withdraw your consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way
should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study.

You may choose to stop taking part in this study after today. If you do, we will remove
your information from the study. However, if we have already completed our research
analysis, we will not be able to remove your information from the study.
Contact Information
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or any problems arise, please
contact Dr. Joel Greenstein at Clemson University at 864-656-5649. If you have any
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the
ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071.
Consent
I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.
I give my consent to participate in this study.
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________ Date:
_________________

A copy of this consent form will be given to you.
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Appendix G
PREFERENCE RANKING QUESTIONNAIRE

GENERAL

Participant:

______________________ (This will be filled out by the test administrator.)

Age:

______________________

Gender:

Male

Female

EDUCATION

1. Please select your academic level:
Undergraduate student
Graduate student (Master’s or Ph.D.)
Other
(Please specify: ____________________________________________)

2. List your major area of study: ____________________________________________

RANK THE PASSWORDS

Rank the passwords that you prefer the most to be assigned to you as #1 and least preferred as #3

1. Password - kholscx
Rank # ________
2. Password - djh45j
Rank # ________

3. Password - V#l9N
Rank # ________
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